MOSUL, Iraq — The gunfire started at 10 a.m. and did not stop for five hours.

It took the full weight of American military power — attack helicopters, armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles and roughly 200 soldiers — to kill two men and a teenager hiding inside a reinforced concrete villa on a quiet residential street in this northern Iraqi city.

By the time the last shot was fired and the building was finally cleared, more than 10 hours had passed since the first American soldier approached the front door and ordered the occupants to surrender.

Uday Hussein, 39, and Qusay Hussein, 37, the two sons of the deposed Iraqi dictator, were dead. So was Qusay’s 14-year-old son, Mustafa, and a single bodyguard who had stayed with them until the end.

The operation that ended their lives began with a tip. In the early hours of July 22, 2003, an Iraqi informant contacted American forces in Mosul with specific intelligence: the two most wanted men in Iraq, after their father, were hiding inside a villa in the Falah neighborhood of western Mosul.

The information was passed up the chain of command immediately. Major General David Petraeus, commander of the 101st Airborne Division and the officer responsible for Mosul, was informed. The decision was made to move that same morning.

Speed was critical. Every hour increased the chance that the brothers would slip away.

By late morning, American forces were quietly moving into position. About 200 soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division took part, supported by members of Task Force 20, the secretive special operations unit responsible for hunting high-value targets across Iraq. Armored vehicles blocked nearby roads.

Helicopters waited overhead. The neighborhood was gradually sealed off without alerting the people inside.

At approximately 10 a. m. local time, the operation began.

American forces approached the villa and ordered the occupants to surrender. The response was immediate and violent. Gunfire erupted from the building, accurate enough to force the first group of soldiers to pull back.

Within minutes, four American soldiers had been wounded.

What had started as a capture mission was now becoming a siege. The villa itself was a major problem. Its reinforced concrete walls absorbed small arms fire with little effect.

The men inside could fire through windows while remaining largely protected. Every attempt to move closer was met with sustained and well-aimed gunfire.

The four people inside were not panicking. They were fighting according to a plan.

American forces escalated. Humvees equipped with M2 . 50 caliber machine guns opened fire on the building.

Mark 19 automatic grenade launchers, capable of firing 40 mm grenades at high rates, targeted the upper floor. Stryker armored vehicles moved into positions where they could fire directly at the structure. The villa absorbed the punishment.

The shooting from inside continued.

Above the neighborhood, OH-58D Kiowa helicopters circled the compound, providing surveillance and supporting the troops on the ground. Residents who had not already fled were trapped inside nearby homes, listening as what sounded like a full-scale battle unfolded in the middle of a residential street.

By midday, the operation had been going on for about two hours, and the villa was still holding out. US commanders decided to use heavier weapons rarely used against a single house in a residential area. TOW missiles, designed to destroy heavily armored tanks, were fired directly at the villa.

They punched through the walls, causing major damage. Parts of the upper floor collapsed. Fires broke out inside.

A section of the roof on the eastern side came down.

The gunfire from inside slowed down. Then it stopped for a short time. Then it started again.

This is the part that many people who were there still struggle to explain. Anti-tank missiles had torn through the building. Parts of the house were collapsing.

Fires were spreading inside. Yet people were still shooting back. Four people inside a burning and collapsing house were continuing to fight against around 200 soldiers supported by attack helicopters.

The battle continued for more than four hours. At around 3 p. m.

local time, the gunfire from inside finally stopped. After more than five hours of fighting, the weapons inside the villa fell silent.

US forces stayed in position. Parts of the building were still burning. Rubble covered the street.

No one rushed inside. The perimeter remained secure. Then the slow process of clearing the building began.

Entering a structure that had been hit by anti-tank missiles, thousands of machine gun rounds, and fire was not something soldiers could do quickly. Small teams moved forward carefully through the debris. The structure was unstable and could collapse further at any moment.

Smoke still filled what remained of the rooms.

Inside, they found four bodies. Uday Hussein, Qusay Hussein, a bodyguard, and Mustafa Hussein. How a 14-year-old ended up inside that siege remains unclear.

Nobody knows whether Qusay had nowhere else to leave him, whether Mustafa chose to stay, or whether anyone inside the villa truly believed they could survive. What is known is that he was there, and that he died there.

The bodies were removed and taken to a secure US military facility. By the time the site was completely cleared and secured, it was after 8 p. m.

The operation had lasted from roughly 10 a. m. until 8:30 p.

m. — about 10 and a half hours from first contact to final clearance.

The identification process began immediately. The US military could not afford to make a mistake. The entire importance of the operation depended on correctly identifying the bodies.

A wrong announcement would have been a major embarrassment and a propaganda disaster.

The first step was physical identification. Uday’s body showed the well-known injuries from the 1996 assassination attempt. His damaged left leg, bone reconstruction work, and evidence of multiple surgeries matched medical records obtained through intelligence sources.

Qusai also had several identifying features. Investigators compared measurements, dental records, and physical markings with existing intelligence files.

On July 24, 2003, two days after the battle, US Central Command officially confirmed the identities. General Ricardo Sanchez, commander of coalition ground forces in Iraq, announced that Uday and Qusay Hussein were dead.

Many Iraqis did not believe it. Years of government lies about wars, casualties, and missing people had created deep distrust of official statements. American announcements were treated with the same suspicion.

Rumors quickly spread through Baghdad and Mosul. Some claimed the brothers had escaped. Others said the bodies were fake or that the entire operation had been staged.

This was more than a public relations problem. One of the main goals of the operation was to show that the old regime was finished. Instead, many people were refusing to believe the evidence.

On July 24 and 25, US military officials made a controversial decision. They released photographs of the bodies. These were not distant or heavily edited images.

They clearly showed the faces of men who had died violently. The photographs were distributed to news organizations around the world. The images appeared on Arabic satellite television, in newspapers, and across the Middle East within hours.

Al Jazeera broadcast them. Iraqi state television, now under coalition control, showed them as well.

Even then, some Iraqis insisted the bodies had been replaced or staged. The debate followed predictable lines. Those most loyal to the former regime were often the least willing to accept that the brothers were dead.

On July 28, 2003, Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt held a detailed press conference. He presented height measurements, weight estimates, dental comparisons, physical characteristics, and DNA results. The evidence was presented piece by piece in front of journalists and cameras.

For much of the international community and many Iraqis, the case was settled. For some people, no amount of evidence would ever be enough.

The Iraqi informant who provided the tip on July 22 reportedly received the full $30 million reward. Exactly how and when the payment was made has never been publicly revealed.

The deaths of Uday and Qusay were expected to be a major turning point. US officials had argued that removing key figures from Saddam’s regime would weaken the insurgency and convince more Iraqis to cooperate with coalition forces.

That’s not what happened. In the weeks after July 22, attacks on coalition troops in the Sunni Triangle continued at roughly the same pace. By August 2003, the insurgency was actually growing.

On August 7, a car bomb hit the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, killing 19 people. On August 19, a truck bomb destroyed the United Nations headquarters at the Canal Hotel, killing 22 people, including Sergio Vieira de Mello. On August 29, a car bomb in Najaf killed more than 85 people, including senior Shia cleric Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim.

The insurgency had already developed its own networks, funding, and motivations. It no longer depended on Saddam’s sons being alive. Former Ba’ath party members, tribal loyalties, foreign fighters crossing from Syria, and growing anger over unemployment, de-Ba’athification policies, and the decision to dissolve the Iraqi army on May 23, 2003, were the real forces driving the violence.

Killing Uday and Qusay removed two powerful men. It didn’t remove the deeper problems that were fueling the war.

Islamic tradition calls for a burial within 24 hours of death. But the US military kept the bodies of Uday and Qusay for 11 days. The delay was caused by the identification process and the uncertainty over what to do with the remains of two internationally wanted figures who were also the sons of a former head of state still on the run.

Eventually, the decision was made to release the bodies to family representatives. On August 2, 2003, the bodies of Uday, Qusay, and Mustafa Hussein were handed over to a tribal representative and taken to Al-Awja, a small town about 12 km south of Tikrit in Salah ad-Din Province. Al-Awja was Saddam Hussein’s birthplace and held deep tribal importance for the Hussein family.

The three were buried in the family cemetery during a private burial. There was no public ceremony, no official mourning, and no state recognition of any kind.

Saddam Hussein learned about the deaths of his sons while hiding somewhere in the Sunni Triangle. No confirmed account of his immediate reaction exists, but people who later claimed to have been with him in various safe houses said he appeared deeply shaken.

Saddam continued moving between hiding places around Tikrit during the rest of 2003. On December 13, 2003, US Army soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division captured him during Operation Red Dawn near the town of Ad-Dawr, about 15 km south of Tikrit. He was found alone inside a small underground hiding place, roughly 2 meters deep and 1 meter wide, on a farm owned by the Muhammad Ibrahim Omar al-Muslit family.

He was unshaven, carrying $750,000 in cash, and offered no resistance.

The man who had ruled Iraq through fear for 24 years was pulled from a hole in the ground by soldiers from a country he’d once believed couldn’t defeat him. He was captured without a single shot being fired.

His trial before the Iraqi Special Tribunal began on October 19, 2005. He was charged over the 1982 killings of 184 Shia men and boys from the town of Dujail after a failed assassination attempt against him. On November 5, 2006, he was found guilty and sentenced to death.

On December 30, 2006, at about 6 a. m. , Saddam Hussein was executed by hanging at Camp Justice, a former military intelligence facility in Baghdad’s Kadhimiya district.

The execution was carried out by Iraqi authorities. Someone in the room recorded the final moments on a mobile phone. The video leaked within hours and quickly spread across the world.

It showed taunts being shouted as the trapdoor opened. It was not a carefully controlled state execution. It was chaotic, messy, and watched by millions on small screens around the world.

The Battle of Fallujah Street is often treated as just another event in the larger Iraq War. It gets mentioned briefly and then forgotten. But what happened there on July 22, 2003, was in many ways a small version of the entire conflict.

Around 200 American soldiers, attack helicopters, Stryker armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles, and special operations forces were all used against a single two-story concrete house containing four people. The operation lasted more than 10 hours. The amount of firepower needed to kill four people inside one building destroyed much of the structure and shook the entire neighborhood around it.

The mission succeeded. But the amount of time, effort, and destruction required to achieve that goal says a great deal about the kind of war that was being fought.